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Abstract
There is a huge variation in the size of labor supply elasticities in the literature, which
hampers policy analysis. While recent studies show that preference heterogeneity
across countries explains little of this variation, we focus on two other important
features: observation period and estimation method. We start with a thorough survey
of existing evidence for both Western Europe and the USA, over a long period and from
different empirical approaches. Then, our meta-analysis attempts to disentangle the
role of time changes and estimation methods. We highlight the key role of time
changes, documenting the incredible fall in labor supply elasticities since the 1980s not
only for the USA but also in the EU. In contrast, we find no compelling evidence that
the choice of estimation method explains variation in elasticity estimates. From our
analysis, we derive important guidelines for policy simulations.
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1 Introduction
Assessing the labor supply responsiveness to tax (and benefit) changes is of key impor-
tance for policy analysis—for example, to predict the effect of tax-benefit policy reforms
ex ante or to calibrate an optimal tax model. Responsiveness is often summarized by a
measure of elasticities or what Chetty et al. (2011) refer to as “steady-state elasticities,”
i.e., wage or income elasticities of labor market participation or worked hours stemming
from a static framework. In principle, these estimates should also provide some infor-
mation on international differences in labor supply responses. However, the variation in
the magnitude of labor supply elasticities found in the literature is huge (see Evers et al.
2008), and there is little agreement among economists on the elasticity size that should
be used in economic policy analyses (Bargain et al. 2014; Fuchs et al. 1998) show that
only a small share of this variation is driven by genuine differences in work preference
across countries.1 In fact, other factors account for the large differences in elasticities that
are observed across studies: (i) the period of investigation (which may reflect changes in
work preferences, for instance) and (ii) modeling choices (estimation method and model
specification). To understand the relative contribution of these two factors, a careful and
comprehensive survey of the literature on steady-state elasticities is required, which we
undertake in the present paper.
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Our survey substantially completes previous reviews on static labor supply models by
providing a wider and more comprehensive comparison of international evidence. Hand-
book studies written in the 1980s mainly focus on estimations using the continuous labor
supply model of Hausman (1981) and provide evidence essentially for individuals in cou-
ples (Hausman 1985b; Pencavel 1986, for marriedmen, Killingsworth andHeckman 1986,
for married women). More recent surveys incorporate some evidence from recent meth-
ods (see Blundell and MaCurdy 1999; Meghir and Phillips 2008) or focus on dynamic
life-cycle models (Keane 2011; Keane and Rogerson 2012; McClelland and Mok 2012).
Yet, most of these surveys mainly summarize the available evidence for the USA and the
UK. Evers et al. (2008) suggest a meta-analysis based on estimates for different Western
countries but focus essentially on those obtained with the traditional Hausman approach.
We provide a fresh characterization of static labor supply elasticities, collecting old
and recent estimates for both Europe and the USA, covering the studies based on the
Hausman method, more recent ones based on discrete-choice structural models, and,
when available, estimates drawn from natural experiments. We focus on the two margins
usually emphasized in the empirical literature on labor supply (Heckman 1993), namely
how individuals respond by varying their hours of work (intensive margin) or by deciding
whether or not to enter the labor force (extensive margin).2 We ignore other margins that
are captured in the literature on the elasticity of taxable income (see Meghir and Phillips
2008 and Saez et al. 2012, for surveys)3 and leave aside the macroeconomic literature, in
which elasticities are often obtained by calibration of general equilibrium models.4 We
compare 282 elasticity estimates resulting from 92 studies, including 156 wage elastici-
ties for individuals in couples, 70 wage elasticities for single individuals and lone parents,
and 56 income elasticities. Our survey broadly confirms the modest consensus reached in
the literature, establishing that own-wage elasticities are largest for married women and
smaller for men. Recent studies confirm these findings but not the negative elasticities for
men as sometimes found in older studies. Estimates for men are generally positive and
small, with some exceptions (for instance, Ireland and some German studies). Some of
the studies for the USA and the UK, but not all, point to substantial elasticities for single
parents while estimates for childless singles are usually missing.
Then, we investigate the relative roles of time changes and estimation techniques in
explaining the diversity of estimates found in the literature (which had not been done
in previous surveys like Evers et al. 2008). Our meta-analysis, based on both visual dis-
plays and meta-regressions, addresses the principal challenge coming from the fact that
supposedly overstated estimates due to the Hausman approach coincided with a period
characterized by low female participation. Restricting our meta-analysis to years of com-
mon support, we find suggestive evidence in favor of the hypothesis of a time decline in
elasticities for both the USA and Europe. This confirms and extends the result of Heim
(2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007) who show that married women’s wage elasticities have
strongly declined over time in the USA. A possible explanation for this finding is that a
more stable attachment of women to the labor market is responsible for modest partici-
pation responses to financial incentives in the recent period. We do not find compelling
evidence that the estimation methods matter for the size of elasticities. Rather, the results
are indeed driven by time trends.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the vari-
ous empirical approaches to estimate static labor supply elasticities. This is particularly
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important to understand potential biases or differences that may be due to the use of
the Hausman approach compared to more recent approaches including discrete-choice
model estimations and quasi-experiments. Section 3 surveys estimates of labor supply
elasticities in the literature. Section 4 suggests a meta-analysis of the respective contribu-
tions of time change and estimation methods. In Section 5, we conclude by discussing the
next steps of research and implications for policy analysis.
2 Estimationmethods: a review
The principal object of examination in this study is the size of wage and income elastici-
ties stemming from static labor supply models. Responsiveness to financial incentives in
these models has been identified in various ways. There is no generally agreed-upon stan-
dard estimation approach, and we provide here a brief critical review. A more technical
and comprehensive presentation of these methods and their identification strategies are
provided in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Blundell et al. (2007).
Traditional estimation techniques rely on some functional specification of a labor sup-
ply function and the underlying consumption-leisure preferences. Estimation is then
made through local linearization of the budget constraint, accounting for the fact that
after-tax wages depend on the labor supply choice (Hall 1973) or using more comprehen-
sive techniques (Hausman 1981, 1985a, 1985b). The approach relies on cross-sectional
variation in working hours and in the two main covariates, i.e., the after-tax wage and
the virtual income (i.e., the intercept of the linearized budget constraint). As a result, the
main identification issue is the endogeneity of wages and unearned income, which can be
seen as an omitted variable problem. Indeed, wages may be endogenous because unob-
servables affecting preferences for work, e.g., being a hardworking person, may well be
correlated with unobservables affecting productivity and hence wages. Unearned income
may be endogenous for similar reasons, i.e., individuals whowork harder because of unob-
served preferences for work are also likely to have accumulated more assets; if unearned
income also represents income from the spouse, positive assortative mating could imply
that hardworking individuals will tend to marry similar persons, another reason for the
endogeneity issue. Hence, estimates obtained from cross-sectional variation in wages and
non-labor income across individuals are potentially biased.
Instrumental variables methods have been suggested, and the validity of the Hausman
approach hinges onwhether the exclusion assumptions of the economicmodel hold. Also,
estimates are potentially contaminated by measurement errors from the division bias (cf.
Ziliak and Kniesner 1999). In addition, a series of practical difficulties limit the applica-
tion of the Hausman method. First, relying on tangency conditions, the Hausman model
is mainly restricted to the case of piecewise linear and convex budget sets, i.e., a par-
tial representation of the effect of tax-benefit policies on household budget constraints.
This limitation applies equally to generalizations of the technique to non-parametric esti-
mations (Blomquist and Newey 2002). To account for non-convexities, as in Hausman
(1985b) and Hausman and Ruud (1984), labor supply must be specified parametrically
together with the corresponding direct utility function, which implies rather restrictive
forms for preferences (see the discussion in van Soest and Das 2001).5 Second, quasi-
concavity of the utility function is implicitly imposed a priori. As discussed by MaCurdy
et al. (1990) and MaCurdy (1992), the Hausman method thus requires global satisfaction
of the Slutsky condition by the labor supply function for internal consistency of themodel,
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an unnecessary behavioral restriction that may bias estimates (see a modern statement
in Heim and Meyer 2003 and Meghir and Phillips 2008).6 Third, the Hausman model
makes it difficult to handle joint labor supply decisions within a couple or participation
decisions. Instead of non-participation following simply from the corner solution of the
model, fixed costs of work can be introduced, yet this additional source of non-convexity
has to be dealt with and results seem to be very sensitive to the model specification (see
the discussion in Bourguignon and Magnac 1990).
Instead of estimating a labor supply function, the discrete-choice approach is based
on the concept of random utility maximization (see Aaberge et al. 1995, 1999; van Soest
1995; or Hoynes 1996, among others). Thus, it requires the explicit parameterization of
consumption-leisure preferences, for utility to be evaluated at each discrete alternative.
Tangency conditions need not be imposed, and the model is in principle very general.
Labor supply decisions are reduced to choosing among a discrete set of possibilities,
e.g., inactivity, part-time, and full-time. This solves several problems encountered with
the Hausman method. In particular, modeling includes non-participation as one of the
options so that both extensive and intensive margins are directly estimated. The com-
plete effect of the tax-benefit system is easily accounted for, even in the presence of
non-convexities in budget sets. Work costs, which also create non-convexities, are dealt
with relatively easily. Estimated as model parameters as in Callan et al. (2009) or Blundell
et al. (2000), they usually improve the fit of these models as they account for the fact
that very few observations exist with a small positive number of worked hours. Very
few restrictions on preferences need to be imposed in discrete-choice models, notably
because fixed costs of work cannot be disentangled from preference parameters, so that it
makes no sense to impose the convexity of preferences (see van Soest et al. 2002; Heim and
Meyer 2003; Bargain 2009). The only restriction to the model is the imposition of increas-
ing monotonicity in consumption, which seems a minimum requirement for meaningful
interpretation and policy analysis. Joint labor supply decision for couples is a straightfor-
ward extension of the basic model in the discrete-choice setting. Yet, many applications
still treat husbands’ working hours fixed at observed levels and focus on the labor sup-
ply of women, i.e., a male chauvinist model (e.g., Bargain 2009; such treatment is typical
in Hausman models, e.g., Killingsworth and Heckman 1986). The implication of such
separable treatment of spouses’ labor supply choices is relatively unknown.
In the discrete-choice approach, identification is mainly provided by non-linearities,
non-convexities, and discontinuities in the budget constraint due to tax-benefit rules
(see the discussion in Blundell et al. 2007 and Bargain et al. 2014). Precisely, individuals
with the same gross wage usually receive different net wages. Indeed, as they are char-
acterized by different circumstances (different marital status, age, family compositions,
home-ownership status, disability status) or levels of non-labor income, their effective
tax schedules are different, i.e., different actual marginal tax rates or benefit withdrawal
rates. Arguably, some of the conditioning characteristics (age, children) are also included
as preference variables in the model so that identification is essentially parametric. In
practice, some exclusion restrictions come naturally. Indeed, tax-benefit rules depend
on characteristics which are much more detailed than usual taste shifters (e.g., benefit
rules depending on detailed geographical information while preferences are assumed to
depend only on urban versus rural areas or on whether the household lives in the capital
city). Additionally, more convincing sources of exogenous variation are also used in some
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studies. Closer to the natural experiment method, these consist in time or regional vari-
ation in tax-benefit rules. For instance, in the USA, variation in income tax rules or in
the parameters of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) across states is used in Eissa
and Hoynes (2004) or Hoynes (1996). Time variation in tax-benefit rules also provides a
better identification when policy reforms occur over the period under consideration, as
discussed, e.g., in Bargain et al. (2014).
A third approach consists in using policy reforms explicitly in order to identify labor
supply responses, without attempting to estimate a structural model (e.g., Eissa and
Liebman 1996). Natural experiments based on important tax-benefit reforms in the USA
and the UK have been extensively used to identify behavioral parameters (see the sur-
vey of Hotz and Scholz 2003, for the USA). For example, Eissa and Liebman (1996) use
a difference-in-difference approach to identify the impact of the EITC reforms on the
labor supply of single mothers. They find compelling evidence that single mothers joined
the labor market in response to increased financial incentives to work. Regarding iden-
tification, the definition of control groups might be an issue in difference-in-difference
approaches. For instance, responses to EITC expansions affecting single mothers were
evaluated using childless women as control group, which may not be ideal given differ-
ent long-term trends in labor supply in the two groups (see Hotz and Scholz 2003).7
Regression discontinuity (RD) is deemed better in this respect since the nature of individ-
uals on both sides of the discontinuity is “as good as random” (cf. Lemieux and Milligan
2008). Overall, much of the evidence is concentrated in studies from the USA, Canada,
and the UK. There is less evidence for other countries and notably for continental Europe
maybe because large reforms, creating exogenous variation in tax-benefit rules, were
less available. Partly for this reason, structural models described above have been very
much in use.8 The timing of response to policy reforms or policy discontinuity is unclear.
Nonetheless, the implicit model that analysts have in mind when discussing the “next-
morning” effect of the policy impact is often a static one (cf. Lemieux and Milligan 2008
or Bargain and Doorley 2011). Reduced-form approaches, based on policy reforms or
discontinuities, are increasingly used because natural experiments probably offer one
of the most credible sources of identification, despite the limitations outlined above. In
this way, it is important to compare estimates from these studies with those stemming
from structural model estimations. Unfortunately, these studies do not systematically
report wage elasticities. They rather report labor supply elasticities to benefit or tax rate
changes. Thus, for comparability purposes, we could include only a few of them in the
present survey. Also, the fact that actual reforms—notably welfare reforms in the USA
and the UK—typically affect couples or single women with children makes that very lit-
tle evidence is available for other demographic groups, in particular for childless single
individuals.
Finally, a few studies rely on long-term changes in wages as well as on observation
grouping in order to address endogeneity and the problem of measurement error in
hourly wages discussed above (Devereux 2003, 2004). Blundell et al. (1998) also use tax-
benefit policy variation over a long period to identify labor supply responses in the UK
using a grouping IV estimator. Long-term variation may pose the problem of assuming
that preferences remain stable in the long run, an issue which is rarely discussed. We
include most of these studies, at least those for which estimates can be compared with
other studies, in our survey.
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3 Static labor supply elasticities: a survey
We present here existing evidence on labor supply elasticities for European couples
(Table 1), European single individuals (Table 2), and all demographic groups in the USA
(Table 3). The reason for this classification is that US studies are more numerous (and,
hence, deserve a particular focus) and sometimes consider several demographic groups
simultaneously (e.g., Pencavel 2002, Devereux 2003). As mentioned before, our focus
is on steady-state elasticities, i.e., elasticities from static (structural) models. We sepa-
rately report uncompensated wage elasticities (total hour and participation responses)
and income elasticities.9 The uncompensated (Marshallian) wage elasticity is defined as




The income elasticity is defined as the percentage change in labor supply h for a 1 %




Using the Slutsky equation, it is straightforward to derive the compensated (Hicksian)
elasticity (capturing only the substitution effect) as
c = u − why 
Y .
The tables highlight methodological differences across studies and notably where elas-
ticities stem from the estimation of continuous labor supply functions (the Hausman
approach), from the estimation of discrete-choice models, and from grouped estima-
tions or natural experiments. We can observe an over-representation of studies based
on discrete-choice models with taxation, as this method is increasingly used around the
world to analyze the effect of fiscal and social policy reforms.11 We do not pretend to
be fully exhaustive but nonetheless attempt to give a sense of the range of elasticities
obtained in the vast literature for Europe and the USA. Some studies do not report elas-
ticities and unfortunately could not be included in our tables.12 This is the case with some
studies using labor supply models (e.g., Hoynes 1996 reports income elasticities but not
wage elasticities) and more generally the case with studies using policy reforms as natu-
ral experiments, as indicated above (for instance, Bingley andWalker 1997, for the UK, or
Eissa and Liebman 1996, for the USA). In addition to Tables 1, 2, and 3, the analysis below
is supported by graphics obtained using wage-elasticity estimates drawn from these tables
(Figs. 1 and 2).
3.1 Overview
Figure 1 plots the distribution of wage-elasticity estimates by demographic group. The
vertical axis reports the frequency (number of estimates). The first observation is that
married women are the group with the largest number of available estimates. The second
lesson from these graphs is that, in line with conventional wisdom, elasticities are largest
among married women and single mothers, with mean values of .43 and .59, respectively.
These groups also showmuch dispersion across available studies.While amajority of esti-
mates for married women are found between 0 and .50, estimates for single mothers are










Table 1 Labor supply elasticities in Europe: couples
Female wage elast. Male wage elast. Income elast.
Country Authors Data selection Model Specification Tax-benefit Hours Particip. Hours Particip. Female Male
Austria Dearing et al. (2007) SILC (2004), at least 1 child
aged <10
D QU; M ITABENA [.07, .19]b
Belgium Orsini (2007, 2012) Panel Survey of Belgian
Households (2000–2001),
working age
D QU and GU +
PTD; J
MODETE [.16, .31] [.10, .19] [.10, .18] [.08, .15]
Dagsvik et al. (2011) National Register Data
(2002), working age
D Polynomial MIMOSI .44 .21 .31 .18
Denmark Smith (1995) Administrative register data
(1980–1986)
C SL PL .061 .093 0 −.025
Frederiksen et al. (2008) Survey by Statistics Denmark
(1996), age 18–59
C SL, FC PL .148 .05 −.007 −.006
Finland Kuismainen (1997) LFS (1989), survey and tax
register; 25–60
C SL, R PL [0, .06] [.11, .27]
Bargain and Orsini (2006) IDS (1998), working age,
men all employed
D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.10, .18] [.10, .17]a
France Bourguignon and Magnac
(1990)
LFS (1985), couples aged
18–60




Laroque and Salanie (2002) Matched LFS-tax returns
(1999), women aged 25–49




Choné et al. (2003) Matched LFS-tax returns
(1997), working age, children
aged <6
D QU, joint wage
and CC; min.
wage
Own calc. 1.05 [.8, .9]b −.19 /−.18a
Bargain and Orsini (2006) HBS (1994/5), working age
women, men all employed
D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.52, .65] [.46,.58]a
Donni and Moreau (2007) HBS (2001), aged 20–60,














Table 1 Labor supply elasticities in Europe: couples (Continued)
Germany Kaiser et al. (1992) SOEP (1983), working age C LL C, NC, D 1.04 −.04 −.18 −.28
Bonin et al. (2002) SOEP (2000), working age, W
and E
D TL + PTD; J IZAmod .27 .20 .21 .19 .15/.09 .01/ 0
Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) SOEP (2002), working age, W
and E
D TU + PTD; J STSM [.16, .55]b [.07, .21]b [.11, .38]b [.07, .23]b
Haan and Steiner (2004) SOEP (2002), working age, W
and E, one- or two-earner cou-
ples
D TU + PTD; J STSM [.08, .56] [.04, .20] [.08, .46] [.07, .26]
Bargain and Orsini (2006) SOEP (1998), working age, men
all employed, W and E
D QU + FC; M EUROMOD [.31, .45] [.27, .38]a
Haan (2006) SOEP (2001), W and E; married
couples, 20–65 years
D TU STSM [.34, .39] [.13, .14] [.19, .22] [.12, .14]
Clauss and Schnabel (2006) SOEP (2004/2005), couples
aged 20–65
D TU; J STSM .37 .14 .24 .16
Wrohlich (2006) SOEP (2002), working age, W
and E
D TU; J; CC STSM [.14, .53]b [.06, .16]b
Dearing et al. (2007) SOEP (2004), at least 1 child
aged <10, W
D QU; M STSM [.13, .24]b
Bargain et al. (2010) SOEP (2003), working age,
potential one- or two-earner
D/H QU + PTD, R; J STSM [.19, .34] [.08, .20] [.05, .08] [.04, .13]
Fuest et al. (2008) SOEP (2004), working age, W
and E, potential one- or
two-earner
D TU+PTD;J FiFoSiM .38 .15 .20 .14
Ireland Callan and van Soest (1996) IDS (1987), desired hours D/H TU + FC, R; J SWITCH [.50, .85] .31/.20a [.10, .20]
Callan et al. (2009) Living in Ireland Survey (1995),
desired hours
D TU + FC, R; J SWITCH [.71, .90] .49 [.21, .31] .20/.21a
Italy Colombino and del Boca (1990) Turin Survey of Couples (1979),
working age
C LL PL 1.18 .64 .52















Table 1 Labor supply elasticities in Europe: couples (Continued)
Aaberge et al.
(2002, 2004)
Survey of Income and Wealth
(1993)
A GU; J Own calc. .66 .51 .12 .02
Netherlands van Soest et al.
(1990)
Labor mobility survey (1985),
working age
C/D LL, R; discrete
wage-hours
combinations
PL [.35, .59] .12 [.15, .19] −.23 −.01
van Soest (1995) SOEP (1987) D TU + PTD, R; J Own calc. [.42, .54] [.05, .09] .008 −.03
van Soest and Das
(2001)
SOEP (1995), aged 16–64,
desired hours
D TU + FC, R; J Own calc. [.67, .74] [.07, .10]
van Soest et al.
(2002)
Dutch SOEP (1995), aged 16–64,
desired hours




Own calc. [.83, 1.36] [.35, .58]a
Bloemen (2009) SEP (1990–2001), couples w/o
children, age 22–60
D QL Own [.22, .61] [.24, .61] −.057
Bloemen (2010) SEP (1990–2002), couples w/o
children, age 22–60





D QU, FC CPB model [.22, .52] [.17, .40] [.05, .19] [.05, .16]
Norway Dagsvik and Strøm
(2006)
Survey of Income and Wealth
(1994/1995); married couples
D Polynomial Statistic Norway model .65 .28
Aaberge and
Colombino (2012)
Survey of Income and Wealth
(1994/1995); married couples
D Polynomial Statistic Norway model .21 .31 .23 .16
Spain García and Suárez
(2003)
ECHP (1994–1995), aged 16–65,
obs. and desired hours
C LL Taxes .37 1.51a −.06
Fernández-Val
(2003)









No taxation .14 .01
Labeaga et al.
(2008)










Table 1 Labor supply elasticities in Europe: couples Continued
Sweden Blomquist (1983) Level of Living Survey (1974), all
employed, aged 25–55




Survey (1983), all employed,
25–65




Level of Living Survey (1981), all
employed, aged 25–55
C LL and QL, R PL, C and NC [.38, .77] [.08, .13] [−.24, −.03]
Blomquist and Newey
(2002)
Level of Living Survey (1973,





Flood et al. (2004) Household Income Survey
(1993), aged 18–64
D TU, R; stigma of W Own calc. .12 0 −.017 −.003
Brink et al. (2007) Longitudinal Individual Data,
Income Distribution Survey,
1999
D TU, R FASIT .18 .15 .06 0





Tax model for Basel-Stadt .56 .36 .03 .01 −.06/−.04 −.001/0
UK Arellano and Meghir
(1992)
British FES and LFS (1983), aged
20–59, with pre-school
children (upper bound for all
children)









Survey (1974), aged <60
C CES utility-based
labor supply, R
PL [.62–2.03] 1.41 −.2/−.14
Blundell and Walker
(1986)















Table 1 Labor supply elasticities in Europe: couples (Continued)




Own calc. [.0, .408]
Blundell et al. (1998) FES (1978–1992), 20–50,
young children (lower
bound if no child)
C Generalized LES,
R
PL [.13, .37]b – [−.19, 0]b
Blundell et al. (2000) Family Resources Survey
(1994–1996)
D QU + FC, R, W TAXBEN [.11–.17]
Data: Income Distribution Survey (IDS), Household Budget Survey (HBS), Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), Family Expenditure Survey (FES), Labor Force Survey (LFS), EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC). For Germany:
West (W), East (E). Model: C = continuous labor supply (Hausman 1981 type); T = tobit model; D = discrete-choice model (van Soest 1995 type); A = estimation of joint distributions of wage and hours (sets of hour-wage opportunities
vary across individuals); H = double hurdle model (labor supply and risk of unemployment). Specification: for Hausman model, labor supply is either linear (LL), quadratic (QL), or semi-log (SL); in discrete-choice models, utility is either
quadratic (QU), translog (TU), or generalized Stone-Geary (GU); random preferences are sometimes accounted for (R) as well additional flexibility, either through fixed costs (FC) or part-time dummies (PTD). Models are
male-chauvinistic (M) or account for joint decision in couples (J). Welfare program participation (W). Childcare costs (CC). Tax-benefit: Hausman model often accounts for piecewise linear budget set (PL) or more generally convex set
(C); non-convexities are sometimes accounted for (NC); differentiability of the budget function can be used (D); with discrete choice models, complete tax-benefit systems are simulated and we indicate the name of the
microsimulation model when it is known. Elasticities: brackets indicate the range of values for all specifications (or the confidence interval when available). bindicates that the range also includes values for different age and number of
children. Particip. = participation elasticities, corresponding to the increase in employment rate in % points, except when indicated by a(in that case, % increase in employment rate). For Spain, several additional references are cited in










Table 2 Labor supply elasticities in Europe: single individuals
Wage elast. Income
Country Authors Data selection Model Specification Tax-benefit Hours Particip. Elast.
Belgium Dagsvik et al. (2011) National Register Data, 2002,
working age, SW
D Polynomial MIMOSI .13 .07
SM .2 .11
Finland Bargain and Orsini (2006) IDS (1998), SW, SP D QU + FC EUROMOD [.18, .34] [.18, .33]
France Bargain and Orsini (2006) HBS (1994/1995), aged 25–49,
SW, SP
D QU + FC EUROMOD [.08, .14] [.04, .07]
Laroque and Salanie (2002) LFS-tax returnmatched dataset
(1999), women aged 25–49, no
civil servants, SW
D Participation (and full/part-time)
model, simultaneous wage and
labor supply estimation, probability
of unemployment, min. wage
Own calc. .36
Germany Bargain and Orsini (2006) SOEP (1998), SW, SP D QU + FC EUROMOD [.09, .18] [.08, .15]
Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) SOEP (2003), SW D TU + PTD STSM [.20, .36] [.05, .09]
Haan and Steiner (2004) SOEP (2002), SW D TU + PTD STSM [.02, .24] [.01, .10]
SM [.08, .31] [.04, .28]
Clauss and Schnabel (2006) SOEP (2004/2005), aged 20–65,
SW
D TU + PTD STSM .38 .18
SM .23 .17
Haan and Uhlendorff (2007) SOEP (2000-2005), age 25–59,
SM
D Reduced form risk model;
non-parametric random
coefficient
STSM [.016, .036] [.05, .12]
Fuest et al. (2008) SOEP (2004), working age, SW D TU + PTD FiFoSiM .28 .13
SM .28 .17
Bargain et al. (2010) SOEP (2003), working age, SW D/H QU + PTD; involuntary
unemployment
STSM [.06, .16] [.04, .10]
SM [.10, .20] [.05, .12]
Italy Aaberge et al. (2002) Survey on Household Income
and Wealth (1993), SW











Table 2 Labor supply elasticities in Europe: single individuals (Continued)
Netherlands Euwals and Van Soest (1999) Dutch SOEP (1988), actual
and desired hours, SW
D TU + FC, R Own calc. [.03, .45]
SM [.03, .18]
Mastrogiacomo et al. (2013) Labour Market Panel,
1999–2005, SW
D QU, FC CPB Model [.04, .62] [.01, .43]
SM [.14, .45] [.09, .32]
Norway Aaberge and Colombino (2012) Survey of Income and
Wealth (1994/1995); SW
D Polynomial Statistic Norway model −.09 .12
SM −.02 .04
Sweden Andrén (2003) HINK (1997–1998), SP D QU+ FC; simulat. withW and
CC
Own calc. [ .55, .87] .50 −.1
Brink et al. (2007) Longitudinal Individual Data,
IDS, 1999, SP
D TU, R FASIT .51 .35
UK Walker (1990) FES (1979–1984), SP D Participation model Benefits only .70





Jenkins (1992) Lone parents survey (1989),
SP
D + H Two positive hour choices,
unemployment risk, FC
Benefits only 1.8




Brewer et al. (2006) FES (1995–2002), aged <60,
SP
D QU + FC, joint with W and
CC, R
TAXBEN 1.02
Data and selection: Income Distribution Survey (IDS), Household Budget Survey (HBS), Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), Family Expenditure Survey (FES), Labor Force Survey (LFS); Selection: single women (SW), single men (SM), single
parents/mothers (SP). Model: C = continuous LS (Hausman 1981 type); T = tobit model; D = discrete model (van Soest 1995 type); A = estimation of joint distributions of wage and hours (sets of hour-wage opportunities vary across
individuals); H = double hurdle model (labor supply and risk of unemployment). Specification: for Hausman model, labor supply is either linear (LL), quadratic (QL), or semi-log (SL); in discrete-choice models, utility is either quadratic
(QU), translog (TU), or generalized Stone-Geary (GU); random preferences (R); fixed costs (FC); welfare participation (W); childcare costs (CC). Tax-benefit: Hausman model often accounts for piecewise linear budget set (PL) or more
generally convex set (C); non-convexities are sometimes accounted for (NC); differentiability of the budget function can be used (D); with discrete choice models, complete tax-benefit systems are simulated and we indicate the name
of the microsimulation model when it is known. Elasticities: brackets indicate the range obtained in function of the specification at use or the confidence interval when available. Particip. = participation elasticities, corresponding to










Table 3 Labor supply elasticities for the USA
Female wage elast. Male wage elast. Income elast.
Authors Data selection Model Specification Hours Particip. Hours Particip. Female Male
Cogan (1981) US NLSW 1967, married women aged
30–35
C SL; reservation hours to
account for FC; no tax-benefit
[.86 , 2.40] [.16 , .66]
Hausman (1981) PSID 1975, married women C LL, PL (C and NC: FC) [.90 , 1.00] [−.13, −.12]
Triest (1990) PSID 1983, married women, aged 25–55 C LL; C and PL; taxes and benefits [.03 , .28] [−.15, −.19]
MaCurdy et al. (1990) PSID 1975: married men, aged 25–55 C LL; PL and D (reconvexified)
budget set; taxes
[−.24, .03] −.01
Dickert et al. (1995) SIPP 1990, single mothers, no assets D Joint program and labor force
participation
.35
Pencavel (1998) CPS 1975–1994, married women, aged
25–60
C Log-L; no tax-benefit [.77, .1.80]
CPS 1975–1994, single women, aged
25–60
[.77, .1.80]
Hoynes (1996) SIPP panel, 1984, married men and
women with children
D Stone-Geary; stigma from
AFDC; tax-benefit system; FC
−.46 −.12




Pencavel (2002) CPS 1999, married men C LL; no tax-benefit [.12, .25]
CPS 1999, single men [.12, .25]
Devereux (2003) Census and PSID, married men C Log-L, no tax-benefit [−.022, .017] [−.061, .001]
Single men [−.022, .017] [−.061, .001]
Devereux (2004) PUMS 1980, 1990, married couples
(participating men)
C Log-L, no tax-benefit [.17, .38] [.00, .07]
Eissa and Hoynes (2004) CPS 1985 to 1997, less educatedmarried
couples with children
D Participation Probit, joint
estimation
.27 .03 −.039 −.007
Blau and Kahn (2007) CPS 1980, married men and women age
25–54
C Log-L [.77, .88] [.01, .07] .004 .001
CPS 1990 C Log-L [.58, .64] [.10, .14] .002 .002










Table 3 Labor supply elasticities for the USA (Continued)
Heim (2007) CPS, 1979–2003, married
women
SL, participation, some account
for tax
.36 (1979) to .14 (2003) .66 (1979) to .03 (2003) −.05 (1979) to −.015 (2003)
Heim (2009) PSID 2001, couples Quadratic utility with continuous
labor supply, J, FC, R
[.24, .33] [.07, .18] [.04, .07] [.00, .003] [−.007, −.006] −.0007
Bishop et al. (2009) CPS, 1979–2003, sing.
women
SL, participation, some account
for tax
.14 (1979) to −.03 (2003) .28 (1979) to .22 (2003) −.014 (1979) to −.019 (2003)
Data: Current Population Survey (CPS), National Longitudinal Surveys of Young Women and Mature Women (NLSW), Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). Model: C= continuous labor supply (Hausman 1981 type); D = discrete-choice model (often a simple participation probit). Specification: Hausman labor supply is either linear (LL), log-linear (Log-L), or semi-log (SL);
random preferences are sometimes accounted for (R) as well as fixed costs (FC). Models sometimes account for piecewise linear budget set (PL) or more generally convex set (C) or non-convexities (NC) and differentiable budget
constraint (D). Elasticities: brackets indicate ranges of values over different specifications or reported confidence intervals. Participation elasticities (“particip”): increase in employ. rate in % points
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Fig. 1 Distribution of wage elasticities by demographic group
Fig. 2 Distribution of wage elasticities by demographic group and country
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men (mean value .12) and childless single women (mean value .23) show much less varia-
tion, andmost estimates stand in a narrow range between 0 and .30. These conclusions do
not change radically if we consider more specific types of elasticities, namely total hour
elasticities or participation elasticities (detailed results available from the authors). We
now discuss each demographic group specifically.
3.2 Demographic groups
Married women Considering Tables 1 and 3, we observe much dispersion in estimates
for married women. This is confirmed in Fig. 2 (top-left quadrant) where we plot the
distribution of wage-elasticity estimates for each country. The black triangular cursors
indicate mean values over all available estimates for each country. Mean elasticities for
the UK and the USA hide a very broad dispersion across studies. Difference in elasticity
size may be driven by heterogeneity in work preferences across countries and over time
or by methodological reasons.
As far as genuine international differences are concerned, we suggest that larger wage
elasticities prevail in countries where women’s participation is low: This seems to be the
case in our survey estimates for Ireland and Italy, which is confirmed in the discussions in
Callan et al. (2009) and Aaberge et al. (2002) for these two countries, respectively. In con-
trast, women’s participation is high in Nordic countries and participation elasticities tend
to be fairly small there, notably in Finland and Denmark and also Sweden and Norway.
An exception is Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990) for Sweden, but the authors
examine data from the 1980s. Comparing Italy and Norway/Sweden, Aaberge et al. (1999)
show that lower participation rates amongmarried women in Italy leads to a larger poten-
tial for reforms that increase financial incentives to work. Larger elasticities coincide with
more intermittent labor force participation patterns in Southern countries and Ireland,
as opposed to more consistent participation and more constant hours in Scandinavian
countries. Apart from these extreme cases, differences across EU countries, and notably
countries of Continental Europe, may not be very large, as suggested by Evers et al. (2008).
This is confirmed by Bargain et al. (2014): Using a harmonized framework for 17 EU
countries and the USA, for the same time period, they find estimates for married women
ranging in a narrow interval .2–.6. This is indeed where mean values lie in Fig. 2 (top-left
quadrant), with few exceptions. They also confirm that most of the responses occur at
the extensive (participation) margin. Contrary to this study, our meta-analysis addresses
comparisons across studies based on different methodological options, notably the period
of investigation and the estimation method. We investigate the role of these two factors
in the next subsection.
Single mothers This demographic group has received some attention in the literature
because of its importance for welfare analysis, given its higher risk of poverty, and because
single-parent families were primarily concerned with reforms like tax credit extensions in
the USA (cf. Hotz and Scholz 2003) or the UK (Blundell et al. 2000). This group is found
to bemore responsive to financial incentives than the average, at least in the UK, the USA,
and Sweden. This is confirmed in Tables 2 and 3, where relatively large elasticities are
shown in several studies, but not all. There is indeed much variance across estimates for
lone mothers, in particular for the UK, as can be seen in Fig. 2 (bottom-right quadrant).
Moderate estimates are found in some studies for the UK (Blundell et al. 1992) and the
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USA (Dickert et al. 1995) while other papers point to much larger elasticities (e.g., Keane
andMoffitt 1998, for the USA or many of the British studies). The largest responses occur
at the extensive margin in the UK, with very high participation elasticities on data from
the 1990s and also in more recent studies (Brewer et al. 2006).
It is noticeable that the group of single parents has become much larger in the recent
period. This is particularly the case in Anglo-Saxon countries, which implies possible
changes in the selection effect. That is, this group may be less negatively selected in terms
of labor market participation in the recent period. For the USA, Bishop et al. (2009) study
all single women over a long period (1979–2003), using a simple estimation of hours and
participation on repeated cross sections. They report a significant decline in hour-wage
elasticities over the period and relatively small elasticities in the recent years (at least
compared to typical estimates for married women).
Men and childless single individuals There is a long history of estimating male labor
supply (see surveys of Hausman 1985b and Pencavel 1986, for married men). Estimates of
wage elasticities for this group are usually very small, often not significant, and sometimes
negative. Studies reported in Table 1 broadly confirm these stylized facts for marriedmen.
There are few exceptions, with larger elasticities in Ireland and in some of the German
studies. Evidence for childless single men and women, gathered in Table 2, is relatively
limited, despite the growing proportion of this demographic group in the population.
This limited evidence is essentially explained by methodological reasons. First, esti-
mates are usually more precise for couples or single mothers than for childless single
individuals. This can be due to the fact that there is less variation in labor market behavior
among childless singles or that non-participation correspondsmore often to demand-side
constraints (rather than to voluntary choice) in their case. This argument equally applies
to single men—yet the fit of labor supply model for married men should be overall bet-
ter when male and female decisions are jointly estimated. Second, estimates stemming
from natural experiments are also limited for this group, given the fact that most wel-
fare reforms in Anglo-Saxon countries concerned individuals or households with children
(see the discussion in Bargain and Doorley 2011). The few available estimates point to
very small elasticities.13 For both men (married or single) and childless single women,
estimates are not only small but also very similar between studies for each country. This
small variance across studies is illustrated in Fig. 2 (top-right quadrant for men and
bottom-left quadrant for childless single women). Nonetheless, these mean values may
hide much variation in participation responses across different wage or income groups,
with important implications for welfare analysis as suggested by Eissa and Liebman (1996)
and confirmed for single individuals in Bargain et al. (2014).
3.3 Income elasticities
Most studies show negative income elasticities of labor supply, i.e., leisure (or non-market
time) is a normal good. Yet, positive income elasticities are encountered in some studies,
which include Kuismanen (1997) for Finland, Flood and MaCurdy (1992) for Sweden,
van Soest (1995) for the Netherlands, and Blau and Kahn (2007) and Cogan (1981) for
the USA. Also, despite being generally small, income elasticities vary across countries.
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) report that variation between studies regarding income
elasticity appears to be greater than the corresponding variation with respect to wage
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elasticities. This is not confirmed in the series of estimates produced for 18 countries in
Bargain et al. (2014) and neither in Tables 1, 2, and 3 here. Note that very few estimates of
income effects are available for single individuals.Since income effects tend to be small, in
most cases, compensated and uncompensated wage elasticities are almost identical and
very few studies report both. While Bargain et al. (2014) report both types of elasticities,
they do not find big differences, in line with their small income elasticities.
4 Meta-analysis of the relative contributions of time changes and estimation
methods
In Tables 1, 2, and 3 and Figs. 1 and 2, we have observed much variation across studies in
the size of wage elasticities, especially formarried women and singlemothers. Studies that
rule out differences in estimation methods and data years show that little of this is due to
genuine variation in preferences across countries (Bargain et al. 2014).We investigate here
the relative roles of time variation and estimation methods in explaining the diversity of
elasticity estimates.
4.1 Graphical analysis
We begin our investigation of the respective contributions of time change versus esti-
mation methods by relying on simple visual inspections. We focus our meta-analysis on
married women and single mothers.
Time trends In Fig. 3 (left quadrant), we plot estimates by year of data collection as
specified in surveyed studies (Tables 1, 2, and 3). A very clear declining trend emerges,
showing in particular a concentration of low elasticities since the end of the 1990s, high
elasticities in the 1970s, and more variation in between. This pattern can be observed for
Fig. 3 Time trend in wage elasticities of married women and single mothers
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both married women and single mothers. Given the small number of US studies report-
ing estimates for the latter group, we focus on married women in the right quadrant of
Fig. 3 where we distinguish between EU and US estimates. The trend is similar in both
regions, with a strong negative correlation between the period of observation and the elas-
ticity level.14 These findings tend to corroborate the result of Heim (2007) and Blau and
Kahn (2007), who show that the labor supply elasticity of married women has strongly
declined over time in the USA. They suggest a change in work preferences of women as
possible explanation, but other explanations are possible (change in childcare policies, in
domestic technology, etc.). Our results reveal that a similar trend exist for EU countries.
Yet, estimates in Heim (2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007) rely on a uniform approach for
the different periods while our meta-analysis possibly mixes time effects and changes in
modeling and estimation methods over time.
Estimation methods To investigate this point further, let us go back to survey Tables 1,
2, and 3. A first observation is that early evidence using the Hausman technique points to
relatively large own-wage elasticities for married women, sometimes close to 1, or even
larger, for instance, in early studies for France, Germany, Italy, or the UK. In contrast,
recent evidence based on discrete-choice models shows more modest elasticities for this
demographic group, in a range between .1 and .5, with some exceptions. In Table 3, we
observe a similar pattern for the USA, with very large estimates in early studies, including
Hausman (1981), and more modest and comparable elasticities in the recent studies (total
hour-wage elasticities ranging between .2 and .4, for instance, in Eissa and Hoynes 2004
or Heim 2007, 2009). Hence, we can conjecture that the estimation method explains time
differences.
What are the possible underlying mechanisms? With the Hausman approach, the com-
bination of restrictive functional forms (linear labor supply) and estimation methods
that impose theoretical consistency of the labor supply model everywhere in the sam-
ple (global satisfaction of Slutsky conditions) can lead to biased estimates and possibly
an overstatement of work incentives, as discussed above. In addition, this approach is
more sensitive to the model specification which may explain the large variance in esti-
mates from the 1970s and 1980s. Mroz (1987) shows how the wage effects of married
women’s labor supply varies dramatically depending on whether and how one controls
for non-random selection into work as well as to alternative exclusion restrictions in
the instrument set for wages. Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) discuss the sensitivity of
their results to the model specification and show that the Hausman approach can lead to
implausibly high elasticity values, as they find in some of their specifications. Drawn from
our tables, we can see for instance that married women’s wage elasticity obtained with the
Hausman approach vary from .28 (Triest 1990) to .97 (Hausman 1981) in the USA, even
when similar periods are considered (1983 and 1975 in these two studies, respectively).
For France, estimates for married women are also very high with the basic Hausman
model but almost zero when introducing fixed costs (cf. Bourguignon andMagnac 1990).
Estimates obtained with discrete-choice models are somewhat more comparable from
one study to the next. Yet, there are still differences, which are more likely driven by selec-
tion criteria (for France, high elasticities are found for families with children in Choné
et al. 2003) and alternative specifications of discrete-choice models (for instance, the
degree of flexibility of the model, see Bargain 2009).
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Time trends versus estimation methods To further investigate whether elasticities
truly decline over time or whether this pattern is due to changes in estimation methods,
we compare the trends in elasticities obtained with the two main methods.15 That is,
Fig. 4 plots against data years the estimates obtained with continuous models (which rely
mainly on the Hausman approach) and those from discrete-choice models (as recently
used in many policy papers). Graphs in the upper panels show that the former was mainly
used before 1990 while the latter approach took over in the 1990s and 2000s.
For continuous models, there are nonetheless some observations in the more recent
years so that we can suggest tentative interpretations. For our group of interest, and
whether single mothers are included (upper panel, right) or not (left), the time shrinking
elasticity hypothesis is verified over all estimates relying on the Hausman approach. The
linear correlation between time and elasticity size is around−.55 for married women with
or without single mothers. When differentiating between regions and focusing on mar-
ried women, in the lower panels of Fig. 4, this meta-analysis corroborates the findings in
Heim (2007) and Blau and Kahn (2007) for the USA (both studies relying on a Hausman-
type approach) and also finds a similar pattern for EU countries. Yet, it is noticeable that
there are very few estimates based on the Hausman model for the period after 1990 in the
EU, so the result is more fragile than for the USA.
If we turn to estimates from discrete-choice models, the upper graphs show fewer
points of observations available before the 1990s. There is nonetheless a negative linear
Fig. 4 Time trend in wage elasticities by broad estimation methods
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correlation between years and estimates due to the high density of very low estimates in
the years 2000s. Over all years, this correlation is −.37 for married women (going down
to −.22 if German estimates, which are numerous in this period, are taken out) and −.47
when adding single mothers (−.40 without Germany). If we take out the 2000s, it goes
down to −.08 for married women and −.34 when adding single mothers (Germany does
not change the picture this time). For a comparison, the correlation between years and
Hausman estimates remain at −.47 over this subperiod (with or without single moth-
ers). The lower panel confirms results for the EU while too few estimates based on
discrete-choice models exist for the USA to attempt any interpretation.
4.2 Meta-regression analysis
To disentangle time changes and estimation methods, we finally proceed with simple
meta-estimations.16 Focusing first on married women, we regress elasticity values for a
set of simple model characteristics.17 Results are reported in Table 4. Reflecting our dis-
cussion above on the limits of our observations, the first columns focus on data years
for which we can find some common support in the use of the two empirical methods.
That is, we restrict our sample to a period starting with the data year of the first estimate
obtained with a discrete-choice model (estimates on CPS 1985 in Eissa and Hoynes 2004
and on the Dutch Labor Mobility Survey 1985 in van Soest et al. 1990). The main conclu-
sion is that estimation periods (“year”) turn out to play a significant role. An additional
year decreases wage elasticities of married women by around .013, which amounts to a
decrease of .31 over a period of 24 years (the duration considered in Heim 2007). This
conclusion holds whether we include the estimation method (a “discrete model” dummy)
or not. In contrast, the estimationmethod is itself broadly insignificant. That is, the “over-
estimation” due to the Hausman model is not particularly visible when time effects are
taken into account.
Results are basically unchanged whether we consider total hour elasticities or participa-
tion response alone (4th and 5th columns). The same is true if we focus on EU estimates
only (6th column) or if we extend the period to all the years in our sample of estimates for
married women (last three columns).18 In this last set of results, the estimation method
alone has a significant effect which likely captures time trends due to the correlation
between period and method. Indeed, this effect disappears when we account for years
while years themselves are unaffected by the inclusion of the estimation method dummy.
Hence, despite the limited common support, these meta-regressions tend to confirm
the shrinking elasticity hypothesis while estimation methods do seem to affect elastic-
ity size much. Up to this point, we have considered only linear time effects. Using all
data years, additional (unreported) regressions with quadratic trend in years show that a
larger decline in elasticities occurred in the early period. This is confirmed by a regres-
sion with dummies for periods 1967–1984 and 1985–1995, which shows that elasticities
were respectively .497 (p value of 0.001) and .145 (p value of 0.053) larger than those in
the reference period of 1996–2004. When using only post-1985 data (common support),
a similar approach confirms that elasticities of the period 1985–1995 were .143 larger
(p value of 0.013) than those in the most recent period. This conveys that much of the
changes in female labor force participation had already taken place in the early period.
Turning back to Table 4, we see that addition controls corresponding to modeling










Table 4Meta-regression of married women’s wage elasticities
On years with common support for the use of both Hausman and discrete modelsa On all yearsb
Model All elasticities Participation elasticities Hourelasticities Without the US All elasticities
Year −0.013*** −0.013*** −0.012** −0.012* −0.013** −0.024*** −0.024***
(.005) (.005) (.007) (.006) (.005) (.004) (.004)
Discrete model 0.012 0.013 0.170 −0.007 0.043 −0.236** −0.012
(.083) (.079) (.251) (.098) (.090) (.095) (.089)
Desired hours 0.258*** 0.185** 0.185** 0.086 0.837** 0.177** 0.253** 0.120 0.121
(.077) (.078) (.079) (.114) (.106) (.083) (.109) (.094) (.095)
Joint decision −0.068 −0.022 −0.026 −0.087 0.024 −0.013 −0.043 0.005 0.008
(.063) (.057) (.062) (.085) (.088) (.067) (.083) (.066) (.071)
Fixed costc 0.007 0.027 0.025 −0.024 0.069 0.014 0.007 0.039 0.041
(.059) (.055) (.057) (.074) (.082) (.060) (.082) (.067) (.070)
US −0.050 −0.049 −0.045 −0.083 0.006 −0.015 −0.044 −0.046
(.088) (.081) (.084) (.150) (.108) (.098) (.080) (.083)
Constant 0.341*** 0.470*** 0.462*** 0.323 0.454*** 0.439*** 0.569*** 1.025*** 1.025***
(.068) (.062) (.079) (.283) (.089) (.085) (.069) (.096) (.096)
Nb of observations 75 75 75 32 43 67 90 90 90
R2 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.22 0.15 0.40 0.40
Note: we regress elasticity values on modeling choices using estimates on adata from 1985 to 2004 and bdata from 1967 to 2004
cWork cost specification in discrete models
∗ ,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance levels at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively
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observed hours, which inflates hour-wage elasticities. This necessarily reflects the role of
demand-side or institutional constraints on working time and the fact that models esti-
mated on observed work duration do underestimate potential labor supply responses.
Finally, Table 5 reports meta-estimates for a larger group including married women
and single mothers. Results are qualitatively very similar to those for married women
alone. The only visible difference is the slightly large time effect obtained for participa-
tion elasticities compared to hour elasticities. This echoes our discussion in the survey
(Section 3.2) about the importance of the extensive margin for the group of single
mothers, especially in the UK.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide an extensive survey of studies estimating static labor supply
elasticities for Western Europe and the USA. We do not only confirm most of the usual
stylized facts from older reviews but also derive original results concerning the variation
in labor supply responses across studies. While Bargain et al. (2014) show that interna-
tional heterogeneity in work preference matters but is small, we investigate the role of two
factors that greatly influence the variance in elasticity size across studies, namely the time
period and the estimation method. It is often suspected that large elasticities found in the
literature are due to either labor market conditions of the 1970s and 1980s (and notably
more intermittent female labor market participation than in the recent period) and/or to
the use of a Hausman-type of model estimation (which tend to overestimate responses
in some of its specifications). More recent estimates based on structural discrete-choice
models with tax-benefit simulations show smaller estimates and relatively more similarity
across studies. Our meta-analysis confirms that elasticities for married women and single
mothers have indeed declined over time in the USA (as shown in Heim 2007 and Blau and
Kahn 2007) and also in the EU. This time effect reflects a possible change in work pref-
erences (and a stronger attachment of women to the labor market), in social preferences
(embodied in public childcare policies), and in domestic technologies. In contrast, we find
less compelling evidence that the choice of estimation method explains much variation in
estimates.
Further validation of these results can be obtained at the price of an extensive estima-
tion of discrete-choice models over the long period. This would also facilitate tests of
the explanations underlying the shrinking elasticity hypothesis of Heim (2007) and Blau
and Kahn (2007). In particular, a change in preferences over the past four decades can
be tested directly on the preference parameters revealed by discrete-choice model esti-
mations. This would require data since at least the early 1980s (and if possible since the
1970s) and tax-benefit simulations for all the years since these periods, in order to use
policy change for robust identification. This research avenue is tedious but clearly feasible
for some countries for which comparable data are available over the long run (the USA,
the UK, and Germany in particular).
Our results have important implications as labor supply elasticities are key parameters
when evaluating or designing optimal tax-benefit policies. For instance, Diamond and
Saez (2011) use an elasticity of 0.25 to derive an optimal top marginal tax rate of 72.7%.
However, an elasticity of 0.6 reduces the optimal tax rate to 52.6%, bringing it closer to
actually observed values. However, our study shows that using a single number obtained










Table 5Meta-regression of married women and single mothers’ wage elasticities
On years with common support for the use of both Hausman and discrete modelsa On all yearsb
Model All elasticities Participation elasticities Hourelasticities Without the US All elasticities
Year −0.020*** −0.020*** −0.033*** −0.011* −0.018*** −0.025*** −0.028***
(.006) (.006) (.010) (.006) (.006) (.004) (.004)
Discrete model 0.004 0.042 −0.230 0.019 0.121 −0.148* 0.122
(.097) (.092) (.279) (.083) (.108) (.090) (.088)
Desired hours 0.225** 0.131 0.127 −0.093 0.246** 0.133 0.215* 0.104 0.083
(.103) (.100) (.101) (.184) (.101) (.099) (.126) (.109) (.109)
Fixed costc −0.065 −0.015 −0.022 −0.113 0.053 −0.041 −0.105 −0.003 −0.024
(.071) (.066) (.068) (.111) (.074) (.067) (.086) (.073) (.074)
US 0.052 0.024 0.035 −0.099 −0.001 0.027 −0.028 −0.001
(.103) (.094) (.097) (.181) (.106) (.104) (.087) (.089)
Constant 0.372*** 0.596*** 0.565*** 1.053*** 0.444*** 0.478*** 0.566*** 1.111*** 1.106***
(.091) (.076) (.102) (.315) (.088) (.108) (.078) (.108) (.107)
Nb of observations 90 90 90 42 48 79 108 108 108
R2 0.06 0.17 0.18 0.29 0.26 016 0.08 0.33 0.34
Note: we regress elasticity values on modeling choices using estimates on adata from 1985 to 2004 and bdata from 1967 to 2004
cWork cost specification in discrete models
∗ ,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance levels at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively
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it should be emphasized that there is not one “right” elasticity. A labor supply elastic-
ity per se is not a deep structural parameter and depends on many factors including the
country (wage distribution, institutions, labor market characteristics), the demographic
group under investigating, and the time period, among others. It seems that country-
specific preferences are not the primary concern. From the amount of evidence collected
and discussed in this paper, policy simulations should rather make use of estimates that
are derived from data collected close to the time period that analysts are looking at and
for the particular demographic groups affected by the policies under study. Making the
“right” choice is not easy, and we suggest using a range of “plausible” values for sensi-
tivity checks. One may want to avoid using reduced-form estimates which lack external
validity, if simulations imply important changes in a wide range of policies. As for estima-
tions of new elasticities (our survey has shown that there are very few estimates available
for some countries and some periods), one may prefer discrete-choice models than other
structural approaches like the Hausman model. We found not clear evidence for sig-
nificant average differences in elasticity sizes, and the critiques of the Hausman model
might be overstated. However, as discussed in Section 2, discrete models usually provide a
more comprehensive setting that accounts for the complete set of fiscal and social incen-
tives, for explicit intensive versus extensive margins of response, and for joint decisions
within couples. Estimates in our survey also show less variability across studies, conveying
that the Hausman approach is too sensitive to specification choices. Whatever the struc-
tural approach used for policy simulations, however, better identification strategies may
be required than tax non-linearities in cross-sectional data. Identification of behavioral
parameters may rely on exogenous variation from tax reforms (as in Blundell et al. 1998),
experimental data, or quasi-experiments like discontinuities (Bargain and Doorley 2016).
Endnotes
1 Bargain et al. (2014) conduct an estimate labor supply elasticities for 17 European
countries and the USA, separately by gender and marital status. Measurement differ-
ences are netted out by using a harmonized empirical approach and comparable data
sources and years. Bargain et al. (2014) find that own-wage elasticities are relatively
small andmuchmore uniform across countries than previously thought. Differences exist
nonetheless and are found not to arise from different tax-benefit systems or demographic
compositions across countries.
2 See Chetty (2012) for an interesting discussion about the potential bias in the estima-
tion of labor supply in the presence of optimization frictions. To cope with this problem,
Chetty provides bounds on the structural elasticities derived from reduced-form esti-
mates that might suffer from optimization friction bias. The derived bounds imply that
frictions affect intensive margin elasticities muchmore than extensive margin elasticities.
3Arguably, these other margins partly relate to responses not directly pertaining to
productive behavior, like tax evasion and optimization. In this regard, hours of work
still constitute an interesting benchmark. Another margin is work effort that may affect
wage rates. In the short run, however, hours and participation are the only variables of
adjustment for a majority of workers.
4 These elasticities are much larger than in microeconomic studies (e.g., Prescott 2004).
Several reasons have been suggested for this: the use of representative agents and diffi-
culties around an aggregation theory when heterogeneity matters (see Blanchard 2006),
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the existence of a social multiplier whereby the utility from not working is increasing in
the number of people who do not work (see Alesina et al. 2005), and factors related to
the timing and the nature of labor supply adjustments in the presence of frictions (Chetty
et al. 2011).
5Another approach is the reconvexification of the budget set. For instance, to esti-
mate the labor supply of married women on 1985 French data, Bourguignon andMagnac
(1990) use the Hausman technique and eliminate minor non-convexities by replacing
the budget set by its convex envelope. This approach is not possible for later years as
the implementation of a minimum income scheme in 1988 has introduced high non-
convexity in the budget constraint. Similar non-convexities arise in all countries with
substantial means-tested transfers.
6 See Eklöf and Sacklén (2000) for a critical discussion of the MaCurdy critique.
7 This issue is shared with the literature on the elasticity of taxable income, whereby
results are sensitive to the type of reforms exploited for identification (Saez et al. 2012).
Indeed, control group definition follows from their income level, so that specific pref-
erences are identified and results cannot be extrapolated. For instance, changes in tax
rates (tax credits) identify the preferences of high (low)-income groups and may not be
generalized to the whole population.
8 Things are changing in the recent period. For France, for instance, some studies
have recently used tax-benefit changes to evaluate the responsiveness of the labor force,
including the introduction of a small tax credit (Stancanelli 2008), time change in income
tax schedule (Carbonnier 2008), changes in the possibility to cumulate welfare payment
for lone mothers and earnings (González 2008), and age condition on children for a
replacement income targeted at low-income mothers who opt for full-time childcare
(Piketty 1998). RD estimations using age conditions on the level of social assistance pro-
gram are also used in Bargain and Doorley (2011), in a similar way as Lemieux and
Milligan (2008) for Canada.
9Note that few papers report uncompensated elasticities. One reason for this is that
income effects are often very small and, hence, compensated and uncompensated elastic-
ities are almost identical. This is confirmed by the findings in Bargain et al. (2014)—one
of the few studies reporting both types of elasticities.
10Note that almost all papers report elasticities with respect to the gross wage. Bargain
et al. (2014) show that net wage elasticities are—mechanically—slightly larger than gross
wage elasticities.
11Note that a variety of different elasticities is used in different studies. For example,
there are compensated and uncompensated wage elasticities, different ways in which the
tax system is (or is not) accounted for, elasticities with respect to gross wage rates or
net wage rates, etc. Moreover, it also may matter how elasticities are aggregated over the
group of interest. Some studies present the elasticity for a benchmark (average) observa-
tion, others an elasticity of total hours of work in the whole group for a uniform wage
rate increase, some even present an average of the elasticities for all observations. How-
ever, most studies report uncompensated elasticities with respect to the gross wage for
total hours of work.We have tried to harmonize the definitions as much as possible when
choosing the elasticities.
12Note that not all papers report elasticities in the same way. It was our task to make
sure that we identified the same parameter—namely the uncompensated wage elasticity
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or the income elasticity—from each paper. We have always chosen the author’s preferred
estimate in case they reported several estimates (for example, as robustness checks).
13 For instance, Euwals and van Soest (1999) report wage elasticities for childless single
individuals in the Netherlands of around .10–.11. For Germany, a series of studies report
estimates between .10 and .36 for childless single men and women.
14We also find similar patterns when looking separately at hour-wage elasticities (cor-
relation of −.59 with observation years) and participation-wage elasticities (correlation
of −.54) for married women.
15 Further potentially important factors are the treatment of wages in the estima-
tion procedure (Löffler et al. 2014) and the choice of the reference tax system for the
benchmark.
16Note that—like all meta-regressions—our analysis is not identifying causal effects
since one can think of several potentially omitted variables.
17Note that we cannot include all possible aspects of model specification in our paper
since there are too many dimensions and to few observations. For example, Löffler et al.
(2014) investigate the role of the treatment of wages for the size of elasticities. In order to
do this, the authors estimate 3500 elasticities using a discrete-choice framework with all
possible permutations of model choices. Unfortunately, such a variation is missing in the
estimates collected for our study.
18We do not report similar estimations for the USA only given the small number of
observations in this case.
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